tions and utilizing a wide network of professionals in his partnership with DEFA.
Analysis of this successful business model bridges the divide between scholarship
on the interzonal film trade and on post-1950 coproductions and import/export patterns. Both individual agency and transnational mediation are indispensable for a holistic understanding of the cinematic dialogue across the Cold War divide.
In September 1990, on the cusp of German reunification, seventy-two-year-old film financier Erich Mehl (1918 Mehl ( -2010 ) opened a letter bearing a familiar signature. By the end of the month, Dr. Bernhard Otto wrote, DEFA-Außenhandel (DEFA foreign trade department, , would be liquidated. 1 As the department's legal counsel,
Otto thanked Mehl for a thirty-five-year-long cooperation with the East German film studio Deutsche Film-Aktiengesellschaft (DEFA, 1946 (DEFA, -1990 . "You have distributed several hundred DEFA films," Otto reminisced, "and showed great prudence and acumen in bringing them to audiences. Your unwavering efforts have contributed a great deal toward DEFA's worldwide prestige. All contracts signed with you were completed in a correct and timely manner and your positive business attitude has enabled and facilitated the export of our films." 2 Otto's seemingly generic gesture of appreciation, however, was by no means a mere form letter announcing the closure of the now dispensable office.
Indeed, behind the laconic lines lay decades of convoluted negotiations and Cold War film politics: DEFA and Mehl had traded in film distribution rights and evaded the ban on East-West German coproductions, thus rendering the Berlin Wall permeable to film business. In his capacity as film financier, distributor, and independent coproducer, Mehl established himself as the only long-standing partner DEFA had in the West until East Germany's political recognition in 1972. The vagaries that marked this enduring relationship suggest an idiosyncratic business model for film exchange that raises the following questions: What economic and ideological incentives did DEFA and the East German government perceive in film trade with Western distributors and producers? What was Mehl's own motivation for coproducing with a studio in the GDR and sustaining a film exchange? What enabled him to establish lasting relations with DEFA-Außenhandel and overcome persisting political hurdles such as bans, censorship, and state-imposed regulations on film production? More broadly, what do we gain from studying such models of successful co-operation across the East-West divide?
By tackling these questions, the present study illuminates Mehl's partnership with DEFA as the driving force behind the continuous film exchange between the two German states during the Cold War. The flexibility of this business model suggests that the circulation of postwar German pictures was governed by economic interest as much as it was subject to political control. In order to uncover possible motivations and models for Mehl's relationship with DEFA-Außenhandel, this essay traces it back to the film exchange across the occupied zones in Germany between 1947 and 1951. The discussion that follows is based on unpublished correspondence and trade documents recently made available in the private archive of Erich Mehl and Dr. Gabriele Ott.
3 Analysis of these sources reveals a lasting partnership between Mehl and DEFA that emerged from the interzonal film exchange, defied the governmental ban on interGerman cooperation in the 1950s, and adapted to shifting political tensions between 1961 and 1990. As I will show, Mehl's role in popularizing DEFA films abroad was indispensable for securing East German cinema's international reputation, as well as for establishing a dialogue between the cinematic cultures of East and West. His success reopens the question of individual agency in forging transnational strategies for negotiating and circumventing political bans. Mehl and his partners at DEFAAußenhandel rehearsed several models of collaboration that include utilizing a wide network of Western independent producers, founding companies beyond German borders, and trading film distribution rights or technical services. All these strategies are illustrated in my discussion of one of Mehl's coproductions with DEFA, SpielbankAffäre (Casino Affair, Artur Pohl, 1957). By remapping the temporal and geographic realm of film exchange as based on the case study of Erich Mehl, this essay achieves two goals: first, it reveals confluences in the presently disengaged fields of research on interzonal film exchange and postwar cinematic cooperation; and, second, it invites a new understanding of the ongoing dialogue between the film cultures of East and West across the ideological Cold War divide.
Continuities and Confluences in Film Exchange
The analysis of Mehl's partnership with DEFA fills in a lacuna in scholarship, where "film exchange" is frequently equated with the interzonal trade in pictures between 1946 and 1951, but remains largely disengaged from studies on German film coproductions and import/export patterns during the Cold War. 4 However, a closer examination of the late 1940s discloses the very preconditions for the crises and conflicts in the following decades: controversies over the transborder film exchange led to a growing split between artists and audiences, who both benefited from the free movement of films, and politicians driven by ideological animosities who wielded the power of censorship. As this article demonstrates, by the mid-1950s this split resulted in the Adenauer government's ban on cinematic cooperation with the GDR, which created a backlash among West German filmmakers and producers. Although Mehl's partnership with DEFA was a response to these later developments, at the same time it relied on models for cooperation established already in the 1940s. It is easy to lose sight of the continuity between events in the 1940s and 50s because scholarship tends to focus on film exchange either before or after 1951. In both periods, however, the cultural politics of the respective governments often clashed with the desires of audiences as well as artists, and thus it is no surprise to find that film exchange as practiced in the 1950s rehearses strategies cultivated in the years immediately after the war.
Researchers such as Peter Stettner, Michael Hanisch, and Claudia Dillmann-Kühn have established the significance of the interzonal exchange for the reconstruction of the German postwar film industry and the survival of independent producers amid competition from foreign companies. For example, Stettner's monograph on Junge Film-Union in the British zone shows how interzonal exchange was the only way to remedy shortages in domestic film supply in the late 1940s. 5 In another study, he connects this moment of crisis to DEFA's early aspirations for economic profit via film exchange with the Western occupied zones. 6 Following Stettner, Hanisch scrutinizes
German media between 1945 and 1953 and concludes that a fair film exchange never took place. Yet he struggles to explain why film trade among the occupied zones still persisted during the Berlin Blockade of 1948-1949 despite censorship and various bans. 7 Some answers to Hanisch's queries about the persistence of film trade are delivered by Dillmann-Kühn's account of producer Artur Brauner's intensive cooperation with the Soviets during that period. In exchange for raw film stock, props, extras, and shooting locations, Brauner provided the Soviet-controlled DEFA with distribution rights to his own films. Because the West German market was so small, even during the Blockade, producers had to look to the East in order to cover their production costs. By foregrounding this trade of services, Dillman-Kühn demonstrates the pivotal role that film exchange played for independent Western producers in the immediate postwar years. 8 These scholars perceptively describe phenomena in the 1940s that are similar to developments from the late 1950s onward without, however, explicitly relating the two periods to each other. Indeed, another growing body of scholarship provides evidence that there was, in fact, an afterlife to the interzonal film exchange. Yet because these studies are oriented toward the 1950s onward, they generally fail to acknowledge how the interzonal exchange had a significant impact on German filmmaking in the following decades. Thomas Heimann, for instance, argues that a renewed crisis in the domestic film industry due to a rapid decline in GDR audience numbers was resolved in 1953 through film coproductions as well as an increase in imports and in the trade of licenses between East and West-a solution to audience dissatisfaction that was stunningly similar to the one offered by the earlier film exchange. 9 Interzonal exchange is also overlooked in recently published collections that attempt to reposition the East German studio within the broader context of transnational film co-operation in the 1950s. 10 At the same time, the legacy of the complex interplay between censorship, political pressure, and artistic aspirations in the late 1940s, discussed by Stettner, Hanisch, and Dillmann-Kühn, subtly resurfaces in these collections. The elision of the 1940s film exchange and its legacy also affects research on postwar producers who reinstated German cinema on the international stage. For example, in his seminal work on West German coproductions in the 1960s, Tim Bergfelder devotes a chapter to Brauner's coproduction agenda and strategies for international film distribution, yet he makes no reference to the producer's 1940s exchange with the Soviets and DEFA, which according to Dillmann-Kühn laid the groundwork for Central Cinema Company's (CCC) later international presence.
11 Ralf Schenk's history of the studio includes a cursory mention of West German producers' interest in working with DEFA, but does not relate this to the interzonal trade. 12 Rosemary Stott provides perhaps the only scholarly account to date that elucidates the germane connections between the interzonal film exchange and the later ideologically motivated policies on film circulation in West Germany.
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The present study benefits from the insights of both groups of scholars and seeks to bridge the divide between research on the years before and after 1951 by analyzing Erich Mehl's partnership with DEFA. In doing so, my discussion offers a new perspective on inter-German contacts and places them on the broader spectrum of European cinematic collaborations, service trade practices, transnational negotiations, and exchanges.
A European Network for Sustaining the German-German Film Exchange
The term "film exchange," as used here, encompasses not only export and import but also transnational collaborations for film financing and coproducing, license trade, and film distribution. Not limited to the German context, these practices are found in various national cinemas such as the collaborations between studios in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and their Western partners in France, Italy, and Britain. 14 
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The fact that Mehl has drawn little attention from film scholars is due not only to scarce media coverage, but also to the nature of his interventions in the film world; shunning the limelight, he conducted his business behind the scenes at film festivals and glamorous premieres. He often invested in projects by other film producers without appearing in the credits, or purchased the distribution rights for a film after a successful opening. Mehl granted few interviews, to friends such as Jürgen Graf, Will Tremper, and Hans Borgelt. In those rare instances when he spoke to the press, Mehl usually lobbied for the release of DEFA films in the West. 19 In the East German media, however, Mehl often went unmentioned in film reviews foregrounding DEFA's achievements. By remaining behind the scenes, Mehl was able to enjoy freedom of movement, tax relief, and stable business connections that rendered his endeavors to bring East German films to Western audiences during the Cold War successful. Mehl's East German partner, DEFA-Außenhandel , played a crucial role in the GDR conceptualization of film as not just a prestige product in cultural exchange, but also a source of substantial economic profit. While DEFA itself was a state-run company and state-subsidized venture, DEFA-Außenhandel's export/import department was entirely dependent on income from the sale of film distribution rights and licenses. Thus, the department held a unique position within DEFA as its only economically self-sustaining division; its mandate was to enhance DEFA's prestige abroad and to generate revenue for the state. While trade with other socialist countries was regulated by bilateral agreements between the nations, DEFA-Außenhandel approached West German and other capitalist markets indirectly, via transnational cooperation with independent film producers and financiers, because they were more flexible and ready to make concessions; also, like Mehl, they were able to function as intermediaries between DEFA and the Adenauer government. Therefore, trading conditions and prices for film licenses were frequently negotiated via film exchange. This often required a balancing act between the utilization of rather limited funds and DEFA-Außenhandel's primary duty: to sell socialist films at a higher price in order to ensure a steady influx of hard currency into state coffers. Over the years, the number of DEFA employees increased from eight in 1953 to fifty-six in 1989, when the company reached an export volume of 8.5 million and import volume of 7.2 million East German marks. 20 These numbers demonstrate that film in the GDR was used for the state's economic gain-an agenda that, as we will see, had its roots in the interzonal film exchange between 1948 and 1951.
Film Exchange during the 1940s
"Film exchange" was the buzzword in the postwar German press at a time when occupation authorities pondered ways to reconstruct the domestic film industry as directors and actors commuted between West Berlin and Babelsberg and young audiences flocked to Grenzkinos (cinemas at the inner German border). Film exchange among the zones was indispensable due to the shortage of qualified film personnel ensuing from the large-scale emigration in the 1930s, difficulties in obtaining a license to produce films, increased importation of foreign pictures (mainly from Hollywood), and moviegoers' need for quality entertainment. With Directive 55, issued by the Allied Control Council on June 25, 1947 , the exchange of pictures was legalized, but not without reservations. 21 Initially the US and its allies were reluctant to endorse unfettered film exchange because they viewed DEFA as the Soviets' "continuation of state control of culture, similar to that constructed under the Nazi regime." 22 24 Afterward, Brauner returned to the Soviet zone to film several comedies and renewed the film exchange with DEFA by trading screening rights. 25 The producer's success in trading with the Soviets despite the Blockade demonstrates how ideological prerogatives could be bent when co-operating with individual partners promised economic gain. Not all collaborations between West Germans and Soviets, however, were as smooth as Brauner's, and the interzonal film exchange soon came to an end. Anxieties about the importation of ideologically tainted films were voiced in West German media, whereas East German papers alleged that the exchange was unequal and boycotted Western pictures, which from then on were only sporadically shown in the Soviet zone. As a result of such controversies, the interzonal film exchange was officially suspended in July 1951 by a decree of the West German government. Eighteen DEFA films had been screened in the Federal Republic between 1948 and 1950, compared to twenty-four West German films shown in the East.
The suspension of the film exchange, however, could not reverse the dynamics of the filmmaking industry overnight. Most Berlin-based film professionals continued to commute between the eastern and western parts of the city. Until 1954, every second film director and every third writer employed by DEFA came from the West, and numerous actors worked simultaneously for DEFA and Western film producers. 26 The main reason for the artists' commute was their anticipation of German reunification sooner rather than later.
Erich Mehl Arrives on the Scene
Similar aspirations for German-German co-operation and the profitable model of film exchange from the 1940s motivated Erich Mehl in 1951 to found Ideal-Film. For Mehl, economic investment in the leading entertainment industry of the time promised a greater return than the stock market, so he began developing his transnational system of film financing. In contrast to Brauner, however, Mehl was not a producer in the common sense of the word. With little experience in selecting film scripts or casting actors, the young investor had to wait for the right opportunity to arrive. The chance came with Vera Mügge, who helped Mehl enter postwar film business on a larger scale. 27 An established costume designer at DEFA and Brauner's CCC, Mügge 28 Similarly, Pepper, the head of EuropaFilmverleih and later the sponsor of Europa-Center in Berlin (1961), put pressure on the federal government on behalf of Mehl. 29 By mobilizing his connections to business circles in West Germany, the film financier not only succeeded in arranging the West German premiere of Der Untertan in 1957, he also inserted himself as a mediator between DEFA and the federal government. Mehl arrived on the scene at a moment when the East German studio was in acute need of liaisons in the West. Since 1951, DEFA had been trying to coerce West German film professionals to work in Babelsberg. This goal became especially urgent in 1953, when DEFA acknowledged a decrease in audience numbers due to the failure of its political films to engage East German viewers. In the following year, the GDR founded a new Ministry of Culture, which urged DEFA's management to require that all filmmakers employed by DEFA relocate to East Berlin. By attracting prominent Western intellectuals via concrete projects such as film coproductions, the GDR government hoped to pave the way for recognition of the socialist state's sovereignty in the West.
In response to the East German government's effort to renew the inter-German film exchange, the Interministerieller Ausschuß für Ost-West Filmfragen (Interministerial commission for East-West film questions, 1953-1966) was founded in Bonn. This commission had its antecedent in General Robertson's ban on media exchange in the British zone, as the name of the commission between 1954 and 1956 suggested: Interministerieller Vorprüfungsausschuß für den Filmaustausch Ost-West (Interministerial commission for preapproval of East-West film exchange). 30 The role of the commission was to determine which films from socialist countries would be distributed in the FRG. Censorship of DEFA and Eastern European films peaked between 1953 and 1957, when out of 307 pictures 50 were banned, comprising 38 percent of the 130 films that were denied import licenses until 1966.
In the mid-1950s, the ban on film cooperation with East German partners elicited a strong reaction from West German film producers, who replicated the 1949 strategy of writing a protest letter to the government and reaching out to the media. On November 9, 1954, the German Film Producers Alliance met in Hamburg to discuss how to oppose the ban. The principals in the deliberations were Hans Abich (Filmaufbau, Göttingen) and F.A. Mainz (Fama Film, Hamburg), and a West Berlin expert in business law, Dr. Eugen Wildermuth (Internationale Filmhandels-GmbH, a film trade holding for the import/export of films across the inner German border). 31 Mehl was also involved behind the scenes, as his correspondence with Hans Abich indicates. 32 However, the concerted effort to challenge political decisions from within went awry. While the commission made minor concessions and agreed to import a few Eastern European films, it remained adamant about prohibiting German-German coproductions.
DEFA Film Coproductions with Pandora
Unlike other Western film producers, Mehl succeeded in trading East German and Eastern European films across political borders because he continuously altered his business strategies in response to the persistent political pressure. Not only did he use Brauner's 1940s model for exchanging films and services with DEFA, he also reinvented it to accommodate additional challenges. For example, founding his Pandora company in Sweden in 1954, while keeping his Ideal-Film offices in Berlin and Munich, allowed him to circumvent legal restrictions on joint coproductions with the East by arranging the exchange of services between his own companies. Such arrangements were already a common practice among producers in West Germany, such as Brauner and Gero Wecker, but Mehl was the first one to deploy this strategy on an international level so he could coproduce with DEFA. Pandora and Ideal-Film continued to participate in the larger network of West German and European film companies that Mehl drew on to provide DEFA-Außenhandel with exchange films, and to hire scriptwriters, actors, and composers for his own coproductions with DEFA. Mehl mediated French, Italian, and West German filmmakers not only for his coproductions with DEFA, but also for other major DEFA projects with European partners. 33 Thus Pandora fulfilled an important role in channeling well-established
Western actors and fresh faces alike into East German coproductions in order to satisfy GDR audiences' hunger for entertainment. Pandora was founded, therefore, solely for the purpose of coproducing films with DEFA for both the domestic and the European markets. In the subsequent five years, four coproductions were realized: Leuchtfeuer (Navigating light, 1954, Wolfgang Staudte), Das Fräulein von Scudéri (Mademoiselle de Scudéri, 1955, Eugen York), Spielbank-Affäre, and Die Schönste (The most beautiful, 1957, Ernst Rechenmacher; second cut 1959, Walter Beck). From his first coproduction with DEFA on, Mehl implemented a series of strategies that reveal his political precautions and continuously worked to improve his system of film financing, which was based on the exchange of services among his own companies. For instance, he financed Pandora without having his name on the records. Instead, a Swedish citizen, Johannes Röhr, functioned as Pandora's managing director. Each time DEFA signed a new contract with Pandora, Mehl went with Röhr to a notary public in Stockholm and received the general power of attorney over the production, financing, and distribution of that film. The plasticity of Mehl's business strategies, coupled with his generous investment in joint projects and the timely completion of his duties, won him-at least initially-the benevolence of GDR officials and censors.
Mehl's flexibility also allowed him to gradually increase his agency as a DEFA partner, as multiple versions of the DEFA/Pandora coproduction contracts suggest. Due to political tensions in both the East and West, the process of amending paragraphs usually continued for several months until the agreement was finalized. A prime example is the first contract signed by Hans Rodenberg (DEFA director), Albert Wilkening (DEFA production director), and Mehl as head of Ideal-Film, dated February 6, 1954 . This document regulated the production of Leuchtfeuer and outlined the business model for subsequent coproductions. Significantly, this contract opened with an announcement that Mehl's partnership with DEFA constituted a "renewal of cooperation in cultural terms"-in other words, a continuation of the obliterated interzonal film exchange. 34 Moreover, the document envisioned a clear division of the partners' responsibilities: DEFA controlled the artistic dimensions of the production while Mehl withdrew from decisions on the story and visual design of the film and accepted responsibility for delivering paychecks to Western actors and the composer, paying half of the director's salary, and covering manufacturing costs up to 35,000 DM. In return, the film financier received full distribution rights for an unlimited time for West Germany, the US, and five other countries. Beyond the agreement for sharing profits, DEFA insisted on being prominently credited in Leuchtfeuer, which was to be the first German-German coproduction; joint credit would become a recurrent point of negotiation in all contracts with Mehl. The East Germans' demands indicate that they saw these projects not only as moneymakers but also as political vehicles to encourage the GDR's recognition abroad. After the 1954 ban on coproductions with DEFA, Mehl's own political situation grew complicated, prompting a redrafting of the Leuchtfeur contract. As a West German citizen, the financier wanted to avoid incurring any liability or inviting accusations from the Adenauer government. The revised contract was signed on March 29, 1954 , by Pandora's Swedish manager Röhr and did not mention Mehl at all. In this second version, the opening paragraph originally referring to the interzonal film exchange now emphasized the partners' "desire for international cooperation," a vague expression that served as a concession to Bonn's recent ban on inter-German relations. Consequently, specific details concerning Mehl's financial investment in the film and his involvement as a coproducer were also omitted. Similar precautions shaped all later contracts with Pandora: even though Mehl himself signed them as a representative of Pandora, the terms of his financial commitment remained unspecified, and his responsibilities constantly shifted.
The DEFA/Pandora coproductions brought into sharp relief the intertwinement of political prerogatives and transnational collaboration. While East German politicians initially viewed these films as economically profitable and instrumental in the GDR's struggle for recognition, later projects that focused on West German realities triggered a swift reassessment and censorship. The first two coproductions were adaptations of well-known literary works and exemplified the socialist government's official stance that East Germany was the sole custodian of the classical German legacy. Set on an island in the Atlantic in 1901 and in seventeenth-century France, respectively, Lechtfeuer and Das Fräulein von Scudéri avoided contemporary problems in divided Germany and featured strong working-class characters. In contrast, Spielbank-Affäre and Die Schönste were set in West Germany and criticized the discrepancy between glamour and gloom in the FRG by contrasting upper-class society's decadent lifestyle, expensive cars, and elegant clothing with the exploitation of innocent citizens and the state's complicity with criminals. Yet despite this layer of social critique, East German censors were troubled by the all-too-alluring representation of life in West Germany in these films. At the peak of the wave of defections from the GDR to the West in 1957, the last DEFA/Pandora coproductions were sanctioned for their superficial opposition to capitalism. 35 Nevertheless, the controversy surrounding Spielbank-Affäre and Die Schönste did not put an end to Mehl's successful business partnership with DEFA, nor did it diminish the East Germans' economic profit from this co-operative venture. In order to understand how the working relationship between Mehl and DEFA was preserved, we need to trace the significant changes in this partnership that took place at various stages of the coproduction process. Spielbank-Affäre is a case in point that demonstrates how the quest for cultural and political prestige came to dominate the agenda. An analysis of this film's production history sheds light on DEFA's internal conflicts at the time, as well as on Mehl's own motivation for pursuing coproductions with the studio and his increasing agency in making decisions about the visual and narrative message of the film.
Negotiations over Spielbank-Affäre
In 1955, when Mehl and DEFA signed the contract for their third joint project, Spielbank-Affäre looked like a promising investment for both partners. The film's premiere was set to coincide with the publication in East Berlin of the novel on which it was loosely based, Hans von Oettingen's Geld ist eine kalte Sache (Money is a tough  business, 1956 ). An insider in the West German gambling industry, Oettingen moved to the GDR in the early 1950s and wrote a fictional memoir exposing the tangled relationship between drug dealing and entertainment, crime, and politics in the FRG. Out of Oettingen's memoir, director and writer Artur Pohl fashioned the story of Sybille Schilling (Gertrud Kückelmann), an aspiring actress in need of money who falls prey to Dr. Busch (Peter Pasetti), a shrewd lawyer who pays her to gamble for him. Busch conspires with Italian mafioso Martinez (Willy A. Kleinau) to undermine the business of Gallinger (Rudolf Forster), a casino owner. At night, Sybille unknowingly spends bogus chips in Gallinger's club; during the day, she dates reporter Gerhard Fischer (Jan Hendriks) who is investigating the counterfeiting affair. Gerhard is oblivious of Sybille's involvement, but his discoveries begin to worry Gallinger, who forces the newspaper's editor to fire the reporter. Meanwhile, Sybille and Gerhard get married, he discovers her secret, and she promises to quit gambling. Yet the couple's struggle to pay accumulating bills sends her to the casino one last time, where she gets caught with the false chips. Gallinger blackmails Sybille and, in her despair, she throws herself in front of a car. Meanwhile, Busch is strangled so he won't speak anymore.
The film received two different endings for its release in East and West, which corresponded to earlier disagreements about the content of the film. 36 The partners' divergent views about the film's ending had already been articulated at the script stage during prolonged debates over whether the finished product should be a piece of polished entertainment or a work of high cinema. This controversy resulted in five different screenplays, in which contested scenes in the casino, the newlyweds' apartment, and various offices were reconceptualized. In the end, DEFA's pursuit of cultural prestige won out. In the GDR version, Gerhard attempts to seek justice from the city's prosecutor, but without success. The couple is devastated, while Gallinger is unapologetic after his court hearing: "No one has been harmed." In the West German version, however, on Mehl's insistence, Gallinger and Martinez had to be brought to justice in the end, with Fischer's help. Though the final script failed to fully satisfy the GDR's Hauptverwaltung Film (Central film administration), its head gave a green light to Spielbank-Affäre due to its potential to reach Western spectators and international film festivals.
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DEFA's quest for prestige was also reflected in endeavors to attract well-known West German actors and film professionals. Writing to DEFA-Außenhandel's head, the studio's managing director, Albert Wilkening, praised Mehl for securing actors "of a stature unavailable in the GDR."
38 Rudolf Forster and Peter Pasetti, for instance, enjoyed a reputation that went back to Weimar cinema, and both had appeared in popular West German romances and comedies. Similarly, West Berlin-based Willy A. Kleinau already had a successful career in DEFA. Between 1950 and his untimely death in 1957, he appeared in fifteen East German films and three coproductions with Pandora. 39 The studio also preferred to hire crew members who had a strong background in popular feature films, such as costume designer Vera Mügge and composer Martin Böttcher, who both worked across the German-German border. However, the predominantly West German crew led by director/writer Pohl and his assistant, Will Tremper, came to see DEFA's expectations for a politically innocuous drama as an imposition on the project. In fact, the East Germans' ability to control the plot and the aesthetic message of the film, as envisaged by the 1955 contract, had diminished. As cameraman Joachim Hasler reminisced, "Pohl had clandestinely changed the film" and, instead of strictly following the carefully edited script, reinvented it after talking to an interested US distributor. 40 The opportunity to break into the US market with Spielbank-Affäre led Mehl to invest in high production values, resulting in a visually opulent wide-screen picture with vibrant colors. Though these qualities would assure the film's success in the West, the party stalwarts' commercial agenda clashed with their political prerogatives once they realized that the film must also be shown in the GDR. When Spielbank-Affäre was screened for the GDR Ministry of Culture, it elicited hostile reactions and determined attempts to censor or even ban the film. Officials denounced not only the Western-style pop music and lavish costumes, but even more the mise-en-scène. The elegant living quarters of a West German couple, which were beyond the reach of socialist citizens, as well as the extravagantly furnished offices of capitalist casino bosses and mafiosi, had to be stripped of their "dangerous appeal," as Minister of Culture Alexander Abusch demanded. 41 As a result, a prestige project shot in color for wide-screen projection would receive its East German premiere in September 1957 in black and white and the regular 35 mm format. Naturally, this angered the West German filmmakers, who boycotted the premiere. Most importantly, coproducer Mehl was disappointed by the GDR functionaries' disfigurement of the film and complained in Der Spiegel that visually, Spielbank-Affäre had been reduced to a "gray sauce."
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Because DEFA was bound by ideological considerations, joint productions typically involved negotiations to reconcile the divergent interests of coproducers. SpielbankAffäre, however, became the scapegoat in a conflict internal to DEFA over the socialist government's changing view regarding the economic and political benefits of co-operating with Western partners. On the one hand, GDR politicians strove to promote and monetarily profit from DEFA's visibility in West Germany; on the other hand, the East German studio had to educate domestic socialist viewers ideologically, a mandate that always trumped the goal of producing an entertaining picture. In this sense, Spielbank-Affäre, though conceived as a showpiece to win international acclaim for DEFA, eventually turned into a fiasco because the predominantly West German filmmakers were unwilling or unable to deliver an educational tale to East German moviegoers. In the words of Wolfgang Jacobsen, the production became "an anti-DEFA DEFA film" decried in West German media as a "dirty SED-affair."
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Even though Spielbank-Affäre generated bad publicity for both the East German studio and Mehl, surprisingly, his partnership with DEFA-Außenhandel continued well into the 1980s. In fact, some strategies involved in this coproduction illuminate Mehl's motives for later co-operating with the film trade department. Most importantly, Mehl's role as DEFA-Außenhandel's exclusive partner in film exchange was anticipated in the 1955 Spielbank-Affäre contract. This document records several steps Mehl took to exert greater influence on decisions about the film. First, he secured his right to veto the ending and to distribute the coproduction under a different title (Parkplatz der großen Sehnsucht [Parking lot named desire], imitating Elia Kazan's 1951 hit). Second, Mehl insisted on organizing a screening for Western distributors once 50 percent of the shooting was completed. Third, he received a distribution license for five years that covered more territory than any previous contract: ten countries in Western Europe, South America, Asia, and the US. In return, the East Germans also posed a new demand: Mehl had to deliver five exchange films to DEFA-Außenhandel for distribution in East and West Berlin. This was not unprecedented in Mehl's collaboration with DEFA's film trading department. Since 1952, he had cofinanced films for Arca (the Immenhof series) and CCC and exchanged them for successful East German productions via DEFA-Außenhandel. However, this clause had never before appeared in DEFA's coproduction contracts, and it confirmed the gradual shift in Mehl's and DEFA's partnership from work on joint projects to a strictly economic relationship with DEFA-Außenhandel based on film exchange.
With Spielbank-Affäre, Mehl demonstrated his ability to leverage his relationships with West German and European producers in order to advance his relationship with DEFA. His strategies included using third-party companies for casting and even cofinancing the film and arranging an elaborate exchange of services (film licenses vs. financial investments), as well as a film exchange scheme. Of course, Mehl derived more than economic profit from this exchange: he was also able to maintain his ties to producers on both sides of the German-German divide, and to sustain his image as the sole mediator between DEFA and Western cinema. Mehl's modus operandi is revealed in his correspondence with Brauner during the preproduction phase of Spielbank-Affäre. Mehl's contract with DEFA obliged him to include West German actors on his payroll, and he asked CCC to assist him with finding fresh faces in exchange for partial distribution rights to the film. On May 31, 1956, Mehl (as director of Ideal-Film) signed a contract with Brauner, committing himself to paying leading actress Gertrud Kückelmann and the secret scriptwriter, Will Tremper. Another contract between Tremper and Brauner, dated June 6, 1956 , reveals that the West Berlin producer used a second company he owned, Alfu, to fulfill this payment, possibly to avoid taxes. The arrangement with Mehl guaranteed Brauner no less than 35 percent of the total return from the film's distribution over five years in the ten countries identified in the 1955 Spielbank-Affäre contract with DEFA. Such tacit involvement in cofinancing in return for distribution rights, as well as the utilization of multiple companies for monetary transfers, was common practice at the time, not only for the CCC head but also for most film investors and distributors in West Germany. 44 This exploitation of the small screen to the advantage of the film exchange was in sync with contemporaneous trends in film distribution on the European market.
51
Mehl himself considered his film exchange with DEFA-Außenhandel the most important aspect of his longstanding partnership with the studio. In 1994 he wrote to film scholar Ralf Schenk, who would become the director of the DEFA-Foundation in Berlin twenty years later: "The bulk of my collaboration with DEFA consisted though in the purchasing licenses or exchange of art films-to the extent this was allowed by the respective federal ministries. To date, two documents in Erich Mehl's private archive attest to the importance of his film exchange with DEFA-Außenhandel for his successful outreach to European audiences. The first document presents a catalogue of 519 exchanged DEFA or Western feature films dating back to 1947 and even includes titles circulated during the years of interzonal exchange. This catalogue reveals continuities not only in terms of Mehl's business model but also in terms of particular genres whose popular appeal persisted beyond the immediate postwar years. Most films that Mehl traded were entertainment features such as musicals, films for children and youth, costume dramas, operetta films, and literary adaptations. Some licenses for DEFA films were renewed several times, which suggests that they were positively received outside of the GDR, as in the case of a number of works by director Hans Müller, such as Zar und Zimmermann (The Czar and the Carpenter, 1955) and Mazurka der Liebe (Mazurka of Love, 1957) , that successfully premiered in West German cinemas, or Gerhard Klein's Berlin Ecke Schönhauser (Berlin Corner Schönhauser 1957). Mehl's selection of DEFA genre productions for the Western markets provides a key to understanding East German cinema as a potent competitor in making quality films across the inner German border, and it also reveals spectators' preferences for certain genres such as children's films or musicals, where DEFA undoubtedly filled a niche market. At the same time, select West German titles that Mehl brought to the GDR, such as Georg Wildhagen's Figaros Hochzeit (The Marriage of Figaro, 1949) , Emilia Galotti (Martin Hellberg, 1958), and Die Buddenbrooks (The Buddenbrooks, Alfred Weidenmann, 1959), suggest that East German importation was also geared toward high-quality productions in order to compensate for meager imports from Hollywood. Similarly, Mehl was able to procure distribution rights to Western films for DEFA-Außenhandel, which later distributed them within the socialist bloc. 56 The second document illustrating Mehl's strategies for film exchange reflects developments from the 1960s on, as East Germans came to prefer less sophisticated films and West German television began to concentrate on documentaries. Mehl Tirol, 1955 ). Mehl's steady provision of Western imports for GDR television that later trickled into other socialist countries turned him into a "Leo Kirch" in the East European context until the late 1970s. Mehl's private records documenting his film exchange with DEFA-Außenhandel provide insight not only into the convoluted routes that this exchange took, but also into aspects of the media landscape of divided Germany in the 1960s and 1970s: audience tastes, television programming, and the fluidity of the film business across national borders.
Conclusion
Mehl's central role in popularizing DEFA films internationally was important for establishing a dialogue between the cinematic cultures of East and West during the Cold War. This dialogue was shaped in equal measure by political, economic, cultural, and cinematic sensibilities. In the case of DEFA-Außenhandel, its trade with Mehl provided the East German government with a crucial financial resource-little acknowledged in scholarship-for battling shortages in the state budget. In addition to earning revenue, DEFA coproductions with Mehl also ensured the GDR's presence in the West before the official recognition of the socialist state in 1972. At the same time, the uneasiness of the East-West dialogue and the creativity and perseverance shown by the West German film financier and DEFA-Außenhandel force us to rethink the role of entrepreneurial individuals in negotiating rigid Cold War politics. The story of Mehl's success as a mediator between European institutions is more than a narrative featuring a marginalized backstage persona; it casts new light on Cold War cinema in its aesthetic, political, and economic dimensions.
